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In his 1964/1965 lecture series entitled History and Freedom, Theodor W. 
Adorno credits Spinoza with being the first modern thinker who in the 
seventeenth century raised “the problem of freedom and determinism.”1 
This is the case because for Spinoza - and therein Adorno identifies in 
him a predecessor of Kantian rationalism - to act properly and thus to act 
freely meant to act “in accordance with reason.”2 But if acting freely is to 
act in accordance with reason - this is the argument Adorno is aiming at 
- and in this sense with what cannot but appear to be a structure already 
established, how can we effectively still call such action free? If we 
act according to reason, is it not reason which determines our actions 
and not us? Does this not mean that when we supposedly act freely, we 
are just following the causality of reason and hence are determined? 
Adorno identifies Spinoza with this problem – the problem of how to 
bring together freedom and reason without losing either –, a problem 
that he further locates as being in the very heart of all properly modern 
philosophy. The problem is: either we emphasize reason and lose freedom, 
or we rescue freedom and sever it from rationality. But the problem’s 
mode of appearance is worse: since it looks as if following the path of 
rationality will bring freedom, but it ultimately and this means practically 
does not. Adorno, as is well-known, will therefore identify Spinoza as one 
thinker in the long series of thinkers who in the last instance attempted 
to dominate, master and control everything in (our free) nature that 
is not rational; Spinoza’s philosophy in this sense, is a philosophy of 
domination; a philosophy whose “axioms… already contain the total 
rationalism he would go on to extract from them so productively through 
the process of deduction,... the insanity of systems as such.”3 Spinoza’s 
rationalism paradigmatically brings forth the insanity of (rational and 
rationalist) systems as such, because his rationalism, and thereby 
prefiguring modern thought tout court, is one of the paradigmatic forms 
in which philosophical madness appears, namely in the form of endorsing 
rationality even if one has to pay the prize of freedom for it. Spinoza’s 
madness and endorsement of rationality are thus the two sides of his 
rationalism. 
This very abbreviated reconstruction of Adorno’s critique is just 
one of many possible examples of how Spinoza was for a long time 
identified with a rationalism that was so rational that it basically turned 
into madness, that ended in determinism and thus did ultimately not 
only abolish freedom but worse – and was in this sense paradigmatic 
for all the abysses of enlightenment thought – thereby ultimately 
abolished rationality itself. In a similar sense, F.H. Jacobi, the great 
1 Adorno 2006, p. 193.
2 Ibid., p. 213.





















classical German philosopher, famously opposed Spinoza’s system, 
whose ontology he equaled with anti-freedom, determinism and with 
the ultimate realization of the principle of “a nihilo nihil fit”, which is 
ultimately the principle of sufficient reason that grounds almost any 
knowledge-based rationalism. Spinoza’s fully rational pantheism (relying 
on the identification of God with nature), in the last instance, turns in 
this reading out to be atheist – as not even God is able to escape the 
power of causal relation. Spinoza, for Jacobi, brings forth the truth of the 
Enlightenment, or more precisely: of the idea of philosophy as science. 
This truth is that scientific thinking in its philosophical form ultimately 
explains away freedom – but therefore, it is essential to read Spinoza, as 
you shall know thy enemy.
Another classical German philosopher, G.W.F Hegel, despite all 
his criticisms of Spinoza’s philosophical system, loudly declared that 
in order to be a philosopher, one has to (first be or) be or become a 
Spinozist. Spinoza is the river one not only has to cross, but the medium 
in which one first has to think, in order to start thinking at all. All thought 
is determined and one does not know what a determination (of thought) is 
if one has not read Spinoza – even though he is ultimately not enough to 
grasp thought properly. 
These are just some of almost endless examples that one can find in 
the history of philosophy, where Spinoza is assigned a crucial, absolutely 
essential, but often also only constitutively intermediary role. In this 
spirit, Spinoza’s philosophy became also an object of poetry or literary 
writing: in Jose Luis Borges, Zbiegnew Herbert, and others. 
So, and maybe surprisingly, the conjuncture changed. Spinoza was 
no longer the object of harsh critique, but rather the subject of immense 
adoration. Recently, Slavoj Žižek even noted that academia today is 
organized under the injunction to love Spinoza:
 
Everyone loves him, from the Althusserian strict "scientific 
materialists" to Deleuzean schizo-anarchists, from rationalist 
critics of religion to the partisans of liberal freedoms and 
tolerances, not to mention feminists like Genevieve Lloyd who 
propose to decipher the mysterious third type of knowledge 
in Ethics as feminine intuitive knowledge surpassing the male 
analytic understanding...4
 
It seems to have become almost impossible today to be critical of 
Spinoza. His reputation was fundamentally and universally transformed. 
From the freedom-mortifying peak of 17th century rationalism to a 






















and positions. But, if this is more than just the symptom of universal 
compatibility, how can we assert and understand Spinoza’s importance 
and influence in academia and contemporary philosophy, for theory 
broadly speaking and even for psychoanalysis? One way of doing 
so would be to identify him as one of the if not the most significant 
predecessor of German Idealism, a philosophical conjuncture wherein 
he without any doubt played a crucial role, and consequently, he might be 
understood as the forebearer of the philosophy that followed him. Does 
something similar hold for (critical) theory, too? For psychoanalysis?
***
In his texts on self-criticism, Louis Althusser rejected the readings of 
his work that depicted it as structuralist. Against such an interpretation, 
he openly declared himself to be a Spinozist. This is certainly because 
Spinoza is clearly the thinker whose presence permeates Althusser’s 
entire opus. One could even consider Spinoza to be a conditioning 
instance, a constant determining point of reference for his thought. For 
Althusser, Spinozist thought potentially entails the greatest lesson in 
heresy the world has ever seen and heresy is the only way of genuine 
thinking - taking the risk of losing it all, being expelled, having no natural 
community to belong to.
In the very same text, Althusser adds a long remark that is worth 
quoting in its entirety:
Hegel begins with Logic, “God before the creation of the world”. 
But as Logic is alienated in Nature, which is alienated in the 
Spirit, which reaches its end in Logic, there is a circle which turns 
within itself, without end and without beginning. The first words 
of the beginning of the Logic tell us: Being is Nothingness. The 
posited beginning is negated: there is no beginning, therefore no 
origin. Spinoza for his part begins with God, but in order to deny 
Him as a Being (Subject) in the universality of His only infinite 
power (Deus = Natura ). Thus Spinoza, like Hegel, rejects every 
thesis of Origin, Transcendence or an Unknowable World, even 
disguised within the absolute interiority of the Essence. But with 
this difference (for the Spinozist negation is not the Hegelian 
negation), that within the void of the Hegelian Being there exists, 
through the negation of the negation, the contemplation of the 
dialectic of a Telos (Telos = Goal), a dialectic which reaches 
its Goals in history: those of the Spirit, subjective, objective 
and absolute, Absolute Presence in transparency. But Spinoza, 
because he “begins with God”, never gets involved with any Goal, 
which, even when it "makes its way forward" in immanence, is 
still figure and thesis of transcendence. The detour via Spinoza 




















in Hegel. In the negation of the negation, in the Aufhebung 
(= transcendence which conserves what it transcends), it 
allowed us to discover the Goal: the special form and site of the 
“mystification” of the Hegelian dialectic.5
 
In other words, according to Althusser, Spinoza rejected the notion of 
the goal or end and by doing so he rejected every element of teleology 
in his position. In Althusser’s view, Spinoza was the critic of ideology 
of his time, during which ideology predominantly appeared in the form 
of religion. He refused to see ideology as an error or as ignorance, 
but located ideology on the level of the imaginary (on the first level of 
knowledge). In his radical criticism of
the central category of imaginary illusion, the Subject, it reached 
into the very heart of bourgeois philosophy, which since the 
fourteenth century had been built on the foundation of the legal 
ideology of the Subject. Spinoza's resolute anti-Cartesianism 
consciously directs itself to this point, and the famous "critical" 
tradition made no mistake here. On this point too Spinoza 
anticipated Hegel, but he went further.6
For Hegel, substance does not exist; it is only a retroactive presupposition 
of the subject. Substance comes into its incomplete existence only 
as a result of the subject, and it is for this conceptual reason that it is 
enunciated as predecessor of the subject. In this regard, the idea that 
the substance is an organic whole is an illusion, precisely because when 
the subject presupposes the substance, it also presupposes it as a split, 
a cut. When substance would ontologically precede the subject, then 
we get a substance endowed with Spinozist attributes, but thereby we 
would ultimately not be able to account for the emergence or existence 
of a subject. What to make thus of this line of argumentation à propos the 
Althusserian concept of the process without a subject within a Spinozist-
Hegelian framing? If we hold this position, then we are in a pre-Kantian 
universe. The Hegelian approach assumes that this understanding of 
substance is dogmatic religious metaphysics, because being/substance 
is posited as a totality, as indivisible One. This totality can be accounted 
for, as such, only in a kind of fantasy (this is precisely what leads Kant 
to elaborate on the antinomies of reason). In this regard, for Hegel, it is 
impossible to think that the substance will become a subject, because it 
always-already entails the indication that it has itself been posited by a 
subject (“not only as a Substance, but also as a Subject”): as it exists only 






















through a positing act of the subject and without the former substance 
is simply a nothing. Here, precision is paramount: when Hegel talks 
about substance and subject, he is here talking about the absolute: it is 
the absolute which is not only a substance, but also a Subject, that the 
“absolute is essentially its result.”7 As Hegel himself put it in his critique 
to Spinoza, “substance is not determined as self-differentiating,” which 
is to say, not as a subject.8
Given these complications, wherein might we detect or locate 
Spinoza’s heresy - that Althusser identified - then precisely? At his time, 
Spinoza’s positions generated endless problems and much hatred, not 
only within the Jewish community, but also among the Protestant clergy. 
We might say he is the excommunicated philosopher in an even twofold 
sense: he was excommunicated from the community of believers and 
for a long time he also became something like the outcast of, a sign of 
the worst in Western thought). The radicality of thought that manifests 
in this fact seems to turn him (again) into a true and quite different 
philosophical paradigm: any philosopher should orient herself and see 
with Spinozist eyes, as Spinozism exploding all traditions thereby is a 
practice of subjective liberation that is needed to do philosophy in the 
first place. 
 How are we then to understand Spinoza’s significance and 
influence? Is there - and how would we answer this - a Spinozist account 
of Spinoza’s effects on the history of philosophy? How does this vary 
since early modern thought and, in particular, how does it differ from 
contemporary philosophy and theory? Contemporary French philosophy, 
from Althusser through Deleuze, Macherey, Balibar to Negri, works, 
broadly speaking under the banner of Spinozism, regardless of its 
different guises and orientations. It is thus interesting to note: Spinozism 
allows for an astounding multiplicity of variations. And the same is true 
for the history of Marxism: Georgi Plekhanov’s declaration that Marxism 
is a “modern Spinozism”, Althusser’s Spinozist-Marxism (that rejects 
Plekhanov’s all-encompassing characterization of Marxism as a world-
view), Negri’s and Hardt’s Spinozist Multitude against Empire, Deleuze’s 
Spinoza of affects, etc. Even one of the more recent influential books 
in the cognitive sciences was Antonio Damasio’s Looking for Spinoza, 
which argues that Spinoza foresaw the discoveries in neuroscience and 
biology, whereby Spinoza seems to become even more a thinker of our 
present and maybe even our contemporary than one might have assumed. 
It is difficult to imagine a philosopher who is a constitutive reference 
for so many opposed philosophical orientations. But is this diversity 
and multitude of Spinozism just contingent (and if so, how can the great 






















thinker of necessity create such a contingency) or ultimately necessary 
(from a Spinozist or, meta-Spinozist perspective)? What precisely is the 
inherent potential of Spinozist thought for such creative multiplication? 
Is Spinoza a figure of contradiction or inconsistency, or can such 
multiplicity only spring from a uniform system)? What would Spinoza 
himself make of the reception of his thought?
It might be that precisely because of the multiform and divergent, 
often conflictual, interpretations that it is nearly impossible to search 
for the ‘real’ or ‘true’ Spinoza. But must there not be a substance of 
Spinozism? The present issue of Crisis and Critique is not an attempt 
to simply map the recent and traditional scholarship on Spinoza, it is 
therefore also not an attempt to produce an issue of ‘Spinoza studies’. 
It is rather an attempt to think with Spinoza, to think through substance 
and to detect the potentials and limitations that have made and make 
Spinoza so productive. This will hopefully allow us to see through his 
eyes into the present.
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